I n August 1941, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill held a series of secret meetings on the USS Augusta and the HMS Prince of Wales, both of which were anchored in a secure Newfoundland bay. Although the United States had not yet entered World War II, Roosevelt and Churchill drew up a blueprint for the post-war order. The Atlantic Charter that they crafted arguably marked the birth of the West–not only did the Atlantic democracies prevail in World War II, but the West, under American leadership, went on to dominate global politics for the next seven decades, capitalizing on its primacy to put in place an international order anchored by liberal democracy and open markets.

The era that opened with the promulgation of the Atlantic Charter may well be drawing to a close. The West is steadily losing its sway. Shifts in the international balance of power; the global economic crisis; the growing assertiveness of China, Russia, and other non-democratic powers; the strength of political Islam–these developments call into question the durability of the international order erected during America’s watch. As the National Intelligence Council recently concluded, "although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States’ relative strength–even in the military realm–will decline and U.S. leverage will become more constrained . . . The U.S. will find itself as one of a number of important actors on the world stage."

Many American strategists recognize the inevitability of a more level global playing field, but they have arrived at an illusory response: that the United States and its democratic allies should dedicate the twilight hours of their primacy to universalizing the Western order. According to G. John Ikenberry, a political scientist at Princeton University, "The United States’ global position may be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first century." The West should "sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible" to ensure that the world continues to play by its rules even as its material preponderance wanes. Such confidence in the universality of the Western order is, however, based on wishful thinking about the likely trajectory of ascending powers, which throughout history have sought to adjust the prevailing order in ways that favor their own interests. Presuming that rising states will readily take their seats at the West’s table is unrealistic and even dangerous, promising to alienate emerging powers that will be pivotal to global stability in the years ahead.

Instead, the West will have to make room for the competing visions of rising powers and prepare for an international system in which its principles no longer serve as the primary anchor. Sinking the roots of the West, founding a "league of democracies," and turning NATO into a global alliance of democratic states would be admirable visions in a politically homogeneous world. But the Western model does not command widespread acceptance. If the next international system is to be characterized by norm-governed order rather than competitive anarchy, it will have to be based on great-power consensus and toleration of political diversity rather than Western primacy and the single-minded pursuit of universal democracy.

To that end, the United States should take the lead in fashioning a more diverse and inclusive global order. Call it the "Autonomy Rule": the terms of the next order should be negotiated among all states, be they democratic or not, that provide responsible governance and broadly promote the autonomy and welfare of their citizens. The West will have to give as much as it gets in shaping the world that comes next.

This approach does not constitute acquiescence to illiberalism, but rather a more progressive understanding of America’s liberal tradition. Just as it does at home, the United States should welcome diversity abroad, accepting that liberal democracy must compete respectfully in the marketplace of ideas with other types of regimes. Indeed, toleration of reasonably just alternative political systems will promote U.S. interests far more effectively than the hubris of neoconservatism or the narrow idealism of the current liberal consensus. Respect for responsible governments, toleration of political and cultural diversity, balance between global governance and devolution to regional authorities, and a more modest brand of globalization–these are the principles around which the next order is most likely to take shape.

The Inevitability of Political Diversity

The Princeton Project on National Security envisages a world of "liberty under law" in which the spread of democracy and open markets combines with the reform of international institutions to globalize the Western order. This vision is an attractive one. And it may well be that China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and other influential non-democracies will follow the West’s model of development and sign up to its notion of international order. As their middle classes grow in size and wealth, their material affluence could well prompt them to demand a greater political voice. But even if this is the case, the transition to liberal democracy will be a gradual one. For now, these countries are succeeding in consolidating capable authoritarian systems which, while not democratic, do enjoy considerable popular support. A poll conducted last year, for example, revealed that over 80 percent of China’s citizens are content with their county’s direction.

According to both neoconservative and liberal proponents of a league of democracies–such as Robert Kagan and Ivo Daalder–autocracies should be effectively sidelined until they embrace democracy and take their place in the current international order. But the global distribution of power is changing far more quickly than the nature of governance in rising non-democracies. Economic, demographic, and military trends favor ascending authoritarian states, and these trends provide their leaders few incentives to gamble on political liberalization. The global financial crisis notwithstanding, growth rates in China should outpace those of mature democracies for years to come. And despite the recent drop in oil prices, Russia, the Persian Gulf sheikdoms, Iran, and other states rich in oil and gas reserves will continue to use their energy revenues to strengthen their domestic control and underwrite their challenge to the West’s vision of international order.

As rising states seek influence commensurate with their wealth and power, they will recast, rather than embrace, the Western order. Maintaining a consensus on the terms of order is difficult enough among great powers that share a commitment to democracy at home. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of a democratic India, recently called for "new global ‘rules of the game’" and the "reform and revitalization" of international institutions. Discord exists even within the West; the United States and many of its European allies have of late parted ways over the role of international institutions, issues of international justice, and the rules determining when the use of force is necessary and legitimate. Such differences will be muted, but by no means eliminated, by new leadership in Washington. Divergent approaches to the conduct of statecraft tend to be even more pronounced among great powers that part company on matters of domestic governance. Washington and Moscow have locked horns of late over a long list of issues, including the enlargement of NATO, missile defense, the independence of Kosovo, and the conflict in Georgia. These differences stem not just from narrow conflicts of interest, but from contrasting conceptions of sovereignty, security, and other institutions of order.

Political diversity among the world’s major players does not mean that a stable international order will prove unattainable. But it does mean that if a stable order is to emerge, its terms will have to be the product of consensus, not Western fiat. As Henry Kissinger cautions, "America will have to learn that world order depends on a structure that participants support because they helped bring it about." Policymakers in Washington will have to rethink the foundations of U.S. statecraft and generate principles that can ground a more diverse, tolerant, and sustainable order.

States in Good Standing: The Autonomy Rule

The starting point for formulating the foundational principles of the next order is to select appropriate criteria for determining which are those states in good standing–and thus stakeholders in the new order. Membership in the "community of nations" should require that a state in good standing seek to improve the lives of its citizens in a manner consistent with their preferences, and in so doing, promote the autonomy of those citizens to pursue their aspirations. In a liberal polity, the state allows its citizens to pursue their aspirations individually and privately. However, other types of responsible polities put less emphasis on individual liberties and instead promote the welfare of their citizens through more collective and paternalistic means. The Autonomy Rule acknowledges that health, prosperity, security, and dignity represent the universal desires of all peoples, but it simultaneously recognizes that liberal democracy does not represent the only vehicle for furthering these objectives.